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“If the people cannot trust their government to do the job for which it exists - to protect them 
and to promote their common welfare - all else is lost.” 
  
Quote: Barack Obama  
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Abstract 
Existing literature on the impact of economic changes on governmental trust presents 
mixed and contradicting findings. These contradicting outcomes of objective economic 
performance on trust can be partially explained by an asymmetrical bias. When economy is bad, 
trust will be affected, if economy is good then trust will not be affected. The credit and sovereign 
debt crisis changed the economic situation in the eurozone countries. In order to examine these 
contradicting claims, this research investigated the changes in governmental trust during the 
sovereign debt crisis. Which factors can be related to governmental trust is examined at 
aggregated and individual level. Trust in EU and national government is examined in order to see 
if they are influenced by the same factors. During the sovereign debt crisis trust levels in the 
eurozone dropped considerably.  At aggregated country level, governmental trust is related to 
unemployment before and during the crisis. A general trend of decline in governmental trust was 
not found. Positive and negative trend lines were found for different countries. Trust in national 
government and EU government is strong and positively correlated to each other, yet the direction 
of causality was not examined. At individual level trust can be best explained by crisis 
performance and by objective and subjective economic indicators. Finally, problem solving 
capacity, economic uncertainty, social status and life satisfaction are of significant, but weak 
influence on trust in national and EU government.   
1. Introduction 
In February 2012, Dutch media suggest that economic conditions are changing rapidly and 
that the expected economic recovery turned into a recession1. A report by the Bertelsmann 
foundation (2012) claims that the debt crisis in Europe leads to a huge social crisis, where 
social tension will rise and confidence in democratic institutions will decline2. These 
messages suggest that the debt crisis has not yet reached its bottom. Followed by a claim that 
the economic crisis is heading towards a social crisis and that confidence in democratic 
institutions will be damaged. However, scientific literature on political trust already suggested 
in 2007 that the credit crisis would affect trust in parts of the political system.  
The report by the Bretelsmann foundation, makes us believe that confidence in 
democratic institution is not yet affected by the crisis. While research by Roth (2009:11) 
showed that trust in specific institutions in the political system were already affected by the 
crisis. In February 2009,  trust in the European Central Bank declined rapidly, as a reaction to 
                                                 
1 
http://archief.nrc.nl/index.php/2012/Februari/24/ECONOMIE/nhnl02025/De+sociale+crisis+begint+nu+in+Euro
pa/check=Y 
2  
http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-
88A31DAD2E2A7537/bst/Europe_in_Dialogue_01_2012_Solidarity.pdf 
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the crisis and the proven instability of banks (Uslaner, 2010: 111). The effect of economic 
conditions on political trust is debated among scientists. Some findings suggest that trust is 
not related to economic changes in inflation, GDP or unemployment (Bok 1997:61). Others 
claim that a failing economy is the best predictor of trust (Lawrence, 1997:130).  Another 
explanation is that economic performance is asymmetrically biased, when economic 
conditions are good trust is not influenced by the economy, if economic conditions are bad 
than trust will be affected. Some scientists claim that trust is not affected by economic 
conditions, the decline of trust is part of a more general decline in trust.  
 Despite the fast amount of studies on trust and a multitude of explanations given, 
findings keep contradicting each other. Is the Bretelsmann foundation right and is the 
confidence in democratic institutions not affected or has trust already been affected since the 
start of the credit crisis? This research aims to investigate at aggregated level how trust is 
affected during the economic crisis by asking the question “Is there a drop of trust during the 
credit crisis and sovereign debt crisis? And if so is it related to economic factors or is it part of 
a more general trend of decline?” 
The answer to this research question can contribute to  a better understanding on how 
crisis influences trust and gives further insight how it has affected the eurozone countries 
individually. It is relevant to study the economic crisis since the crisis still affects us and the 
economic problems are not yet resolved. Studying trust from a societal perspective is of 
importance because trust is considered to be a precondition of stable democracy. (Sullivan 
and Transue, 1999:627). Without trust there is no support for policy (Keele, 2007: 252). This 
support is crucial when fighting a large scale economic crisis, such as the sovereign debt 
crisis. 
7 
 
Still understanding crisis at aggregated country level, does not give us insight in the 
individual basis for trust during the economic crisis. In order to get a complete picture of the 
effects of the crisis, aggregated and individual levels of trust need to be examined.   
The problem with explaining trust in government at individual level is there are 
“plentiful explanations as grains of sand” (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2001: 243).  The 
problem with many of these explanations is that findings are mixed and contradicting. Many 
explanations focus on the way governments work, but not on what they produce. The focus of 
this part of the study will lay on crisis performance, problem solving capacity of the 
government and the expected economic uncertainty citizens have. Economic conditions will 
be taken into account as well as some other possible explanations for trust.  
Political performance is said to be one of the best indicators of trust (Bok, 1997:61). 
Still, this study will not examine the complete government performance, but only crisis 
performance. Until this moment in time problem solving capacity has never been researched 
in combination with trust. Problem solving capacity has proven to be a strong indicator for 
voting behavior. Whether problem solving capacity of the government is an equally strong 
predictor of trust needs to be examined.  The last crisis related explanation is economic 
uncertainty, when the future expectations on the economy become more gloomy, governments 
can be held responsible for not safeguarding these economic conditions (Mughan & Lacy, 
2002: 516) and trust can be affected. This part of the research examines whether crisis related 
explanations do affect individual levels of trust by asking the following question: “Will the 
perceived performance, problem solving capacity and feelings of economic uncertainty have 
effect on the political trust in national and EU government during the economic crisis?” 
The answer to this research question can contribute to a better understanding on how 
trust is affected at individual level and whether crisis related explanations can shed light on 
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trust during times of crisis. The scientific relevance is that special crisis related explanations 
are sought that other scientists have not yet used.   
2. Literature Review, Theory and Concepts  
What is (political) trust? 
Trust has been embraced through history as a quintessential element for social, economic and 
political life. The idea that trust is essential for social, economic and political life dates back 
to philosophers as Confucius (551 B.C. – 479 B.C). Confucius suggested that trust, weapons 
and food are the essentials of government. Food is relevant because well-fed citizens are less 
likely to make trouble. Trust is relevant because in the absence of food, citizens would still 
lay their faith in the hands of the government, trusting that their leaders would work on the 
problem. And last weapons in case neither of the two would work (Newton, 2007:342). 
Trust has been acknowledged as a precondition for efficient economic transactions in 
society. Adam Smith posed that without trust efficient economic transactions are impossible 
(Evensky, 2011:250; Newton, 2007;342). Tocqueville placed trust and voluntary association 
as the mechanism for creating stable democracies (Sullivan and Transue, 1999: 627; 
Newton,2007;342). This idea is passed on into the twentieth and current century by non 
established authors like John Stuart Mill, Georg Simmel, Ferdinand Toennies, Emile 
Durkheim, and Max Weber (Zmerli et al., 2007:35; Newton,2007;342). In the last three 
decades there has been a significant growth in interest in the subject. A large body of evidence 
on trust has become available from research in the political and social sciences. The interest in 
political trust has grown since the early eighties by the work of Luhmann (1979), Barber 
(1983), and Giddens (1990) (Sztompka 1998:20; Bouckaert, et al. 2002: 10).  
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The interest in the subject is stimulated by the transformation of our societies and the 
observable decline of trust in the western societies (Newton, 2007:342). 
Definitions of trust typically refer to a situation where one party, the ‘trustor’ is 
willing to rely on the actions of another party, the ‘trustee’ (Sztompka 1998:20; Bouckaert, et 
al. 2002: 10). Trust might best be seen as a subjective evaluation of a relationship (Meer, van 
der T, 2010:519). Evident is that trust is not one thing and it does not have one source, “it has 
a variety of forms and causes” (Levi,1998: 79). Trust can be defined in many ways and many 
factors are believed to influence, enhance or diminish trust. Therefore many theories are 
developed to explain trust.  
Political trust is seen as the willingness of a party to expose itself to the possibility of 
being exploited by another party” (Bannister and Connolly, 2011: 139). A good definition of 
political trust should incorporate both instrumental and normative aspects. Hetherington 
(2005:9) defines political trust as “the degree to which people perceive that the government is 
producing the outcomes consistent with their expectations”. Governmental trust is “the level 
in confidence citizens have in their government “to do the right thing” and the confidence that 
the government will act appropriately and honestly on behalf of the public. Political trust can 
be directed towards the political system and its organizations, as well as to the individual 
incumbents (Blind 2006:4).  
Systemic trust is the trust that citizens have in their institutions (Roth, 2009:203). 
Systemic trust can be subdivided into “diffuse or system based trust” or into “specific or 
institutional based trust” (Blind: 2006:4). Diffuse political trust is based on citizens 
evaluation of the overall political system or regime. Specific trust is based on the trust that 
citizens have in the different political institutions, for example the government or parties. In 
this study the focus will lay on the trust levels that citizens have in the EU government and 
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the national government, thus institutional or also called specific based trust. Specific trust 
will be more relevant to study because national and EU governments are the political actors 
that deal with the euro-crisis. The government performance and policy during the crisis can 
and will be evaluated by the citizens and will influence trust. 
Cross national changes in trust at aggregated level 
Cross national research to trust at aggregated level has delivered different and contradicting 
explanations for the change in trust. One of the most commonly heard explanations is that the 
decline of trust is a general trend. This trend is measured in all industrialized democracies and 
is linked to the changing political culture (Blind, 2006: 8; Norris and Newton 2000:57; Levi 
and Stoker, 2000: 477). Another explanation for trust is that trust is affected by changing 
circumstances in the countries. Trust is said to react on changing conditions and events, 
especially to economic changes. The credit and sovereign debt crisis have ensured that since 
2007 (in most eurozone countries) economic conditions have negatively changed. In order to 
examine whether there is an impact on trust during times of crisis, the following research 
question will be tested.   
RC1. Is there a drop of trust during the credit crisis and sovereign debt crisis? And if 
 so is it related to economic factors or is it part of a more general trend of decline?  
Since the late 1960s and early 1970s, public trust in government and political 
institutions has been falling in all advanced industrialized democracies (Dogan, 2005: 13). 
Dalton (2005:138) showed that in industrialized democracies trust in political parties has been 
eroding as well. Related to this, public confidence in parliaments has similarly decreased in 
the last decade (Blind, 2006: 8). This erosion of confidence and trust in government is also 
evident in the European Union (Dogan, 2005: 13). The level of mistrust in parliament has 
increased during the last two decades in several European countries (Dogan, 2005:17).  
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In some European countries trust has been declining at an “alarming rate” (Bovens and Wille 
2008: 17). Some researchers even claim that political trust is caught in a vicious circle of 
distrust (Patterson, 1999: 151).  
On the other hand “a vicious circle of distrust” is contradicted by many scientists. 
Trust levels are bound to fluctuations and differ considerably over the different time frames. 
These fluctuations are due to changes in circumstances (Bovens and Wille 2008:52).  
Specific conditions and events will influence confidence and trust and not only in a negative 
way (Orren, 1997: 84, Van de Walle et. al, 2008:61). For example, trust levels in The United 
Stated of America rose during economic stronger periods (Citrin & Luks, 2001:9).   
In Clinton’s presidency (period 1994-1996) the economy was strong, this resulted in a 
rebound of trust (Alford, 2001:32). As Bill Clinton phrased in his presidential campaign 
against George Bush ‘It’s the economy, stupid’ (Cameron and Crosby, 2000: 354).  
Another event that influenced trust was the attack on the twin towers, which resulted in a rise 
in government trust (Hetherington, 2005: 30). This phenomenon is called the “rally around the 
flag” effect, when threat is opposed from outside, citizens try to find protection by the state, 
which leads to growing trust (Hetherington and Nelson, 2003; Dalton, 2005: 151; 
Hetherington and Rudolph, 2008: 498).  Fluctuations in trust are often linked to the economic 
state where countries are in (Lawrence, 1997: 130).  
Research on the effects of economic crises on trust often has very corresponding 
findings; trust is affected negatively by economic crisis. During economic crisis citizens can 
feel betrayed by the politicians and governments, this leads to a breach of trust (Fowler and 
Etchegary, 2008: 338). Next to a loss of trust in government and politicians there can also be a 
loss in trust in political institutions. For example during the credit crisis citizens’ trust in the 
European Central Bank, dropped alarmingly (Roth, 2009: 204; Wälti, 2011: 8). If citizens feel 
that institutions are responsible for the crisis and did not try to overcome or prevent such 
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events to happen then trust will be affected. If economic crises have negative effect on trust 
than it can be expected that during the credit crunch and the European sovereign debt crisis 
trust in national and EU government dropped. This leads to the following hypothesis:  
 H1. The credit crisis and the sovereign debt crisis led to less trust in national and 
 EU government. 
The counter argument is that trust is not only influenced by specific events, such as the 
economic crisis. The drop of trust is rooted in a more serious problem of deterioration of trust, 
based on changing political culture, postmaterialist values, polarization and the public arena 
as battlefield (King, 1997: 157; Catterberg and Moreno, 1996:32; Inglehart, 1997: 235).  
A situation that is further aggravated by the progressively negative media coverage on 
politics. Scandals and corruption are often given more news value than policy (Newton, 2006: 
212; Blind 2007:8; Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005: 71). By some scientists it is rejected that 
economic conditions play a major role in the building of trust. Countries that show evidence 
of economic progress still were victims of deteriorating trust (Bok, 1997:77; Ney, 1997:10; 
Barnes and Gill, 2000:16). To assume that a simultaneous decline of trust throughout 
advanced industrial democracies during the late twentieth century was purely coincidental and 
based on the shrinkage of economies seems unlikely. This study will examine if there are 
(negative) linear trends for trust in national and EU government. This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
  H2. The decline of trust stems from a general deteriorating trend therefore when time 
 progresses, trust will decline. 
Still, if there is a drop during the economic crisis that cannot be explained by a general 
trend of declining trust than which economic indicators will be related trust? Research by Bok 
on trust in the USA (1997:76) showed that inflation, GDP and unemployment had no linkage 
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to trust at all. Contradicting are the findings of Roth (et al 2011: 20), in the countries of the 
European Union aggregated levels of trust were affected by inflation, unemployment and 
debt. Inflation reduces trust under good economic condition rather than under bad economic 
conditions. Unemployment influences trust during good and bad economic conditions, but are 
influenced more strongly during bad economic conditions. Increase of debt reduced trust 
under good and bad economic conditions equally (Roth et al, 2011:21). Based on these 
previous findings, the expectations are that inflation, unemployment and debt are related to 
trust in the eurozone countries. The findings of Roth, seem to be more adjusted to the 
situation in Europe, therefore it is expected is that these findings will relate more to this study 
than the findings of Bok (1997:76). This leads to the following hypothesis: 
  H3. If inflation, unemployment and governmental debt grows, trust declines. 
The conducted research focuses on trust in national and EU government, but is there a 
relationship between trust in national and EU government? It is claimed that the EU 
government cannot be evaluated as an independent level of government. Evaluation of EU 
government is said to be linked to nation state institutions (Muñoz, et al. 2011: 570).  
There are two different theories on the relationship between trust in national 
government and trust in EU government. The first theory is known as the congruence model, 
developed by Anderson (1998:576). The congruence model suggests that due to limited 
information on politics at the European level, citizens use their opinions based on domestic 
information as proxy for trust. This is often referred to as the spill over theory. The second 
model, the “compensation model”, states that citizens with positive evaluations regarding 
their national institutions compare the European institutions to a higher standard. Therefore 
trust in national institutions will decrease the trust in European institutions (Kritzinger, 2003: 
221). 
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Contradicting theories are developed to explain this relationship, in order to test 
whether trust in national and EU government are related, the second research question will be 
tested. 
 RC2. Is there a relationship between national and EU government and is this 
 relationship of congruent or compensational nature.  
 Primary research findings suggest that “Individual trust in national parliament 
influences trust in European Parliament positively” (Muñoz, et al. 2011: 570). While trust in 
national parliament at country level has a negative effect on trust in the European Parliament 
(Muñoz, et al. 2011: 570; Roth, et al, 2011: 9). This research will try to understand, at 
aggregated country level, whether there are patterns to discover that confirm the congruence 
or the compensation model.  Whether trust in national and EU government is in the same way 
related as trust in national and EU parliament needs to be investigated. 
Possible explanations for trust and distrust at individual level 
Trust at aggregated level is known in a variety of forms and causes, the scientific literature 
poses a equivalent of imposing explanations for trust at individual level (Levi,1998: 79). 
Political, personal and economic spheres were examined to find the origin of trust in 
government. In order to create a complete picture on trust during the sovereign debt crisis, it 
is relevant to study aggregate country levels and individual bases for trust. The goal is to 
examine whether specific conditions which are altered by the crisis have influenced the 
individual levels of trust. This study will try to explain trust by focusing on crisis 
performance, problem solving capacity and feelings of economic uncertainty. Other 
explanations for trust will be tested in order to give a complete insight in trust at individual 
level.  
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The corresponding third research question examined is: 
  RC3. Will the perceived performance, problem solving capacity and feelings of 
 economic uncertainty have effect on the political trust in national and EU government 
 during the economic crisis? 
Political performance 
Political factors that influence trust can be related to many aspects of the political spectrum. 
The political system can have negative and positive effects on individual trust levels.  
As an example, former communist countries manifest a great distrust for national government 
but a great trust in European government (Muñoz, et al. 2011: 569). The transparency and 
fairness of political systems are also of influence on trust. Corruption is seen as an important 
determinant of political distrust (Anderson and Tverdova 2003:19; Blind: 2007:13; Catterberg 
and Moreno, 2006: 32).  
 Parts of the political system can affect trust as well. Politicians can harm trust by dirty 
campaigning and by being involved in scandals, leading to a feeling that politicians are 
corrupt and untrustworthy (Neckel, 2005: 103). Governments can influence trust by their 
policies and performance.  
 Government performance is often said to be one of the best indicators of governmental 
trust (Bok: 1997: 61; Asvik at al. 2011: 431; Hudson, 2006: 59). Performance can have an 
objective and a subjective meaning. Objective economic government performance is often 
linked to unemployment rates, economic growth, and inflation. Subjective political 
performance is linked to government stability and policy. Objective economic government 
performance is said to be asymmetrically biased.  When economic conditions are bad than 
trust will be affected, but when economic conditions are good, than trust in government will 
not grow (Bouckaert et al. 2002:65). The subjective evaluation of government performance is 
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based on what citizens perceive of the performance (Papadakis, 1999:90). This subjective 
evaluation of government performance seems to be the best measure of explaining trust. The 
subjective evaluations of trust are most of the time a trade-off between the reality and the 
expectations people have (Lawrence, 1997: 130). When expectations are high, it will become 
more difficult for governments to reach those expectations. Citizens will be disappointed and 
frustrated if government does not reach its “potential” and performance will be evaluated 
negatively. A performance model that is used to explain the relationship between performance 
and trust is the Performance–satisfaction of customers–trust in institutions model (Bouckaert 
et al 2002: 56). In this model performance will lead to more satisfied customers and this will 
result in a higher level of trust in institutions (Bouckaert and Walle, 2003: 329). Performance 
needs not only to be good, but also needs to be seen as good. In the end it all seems to be a 
matter of perception management whether citizens trust their institutions. By lowering the 
expectations and by keeping performance up, it should lead to positive evaluations, followed 
by more trust. 
 The strongest critique on subjective performance measures is that it does not measure 
the actual performance, but the gap between expectations and performance. Another point of 
criticism is that citizens might already have a negative perception or distrust towards the 
government, regardless of how government will perform. Therefore trust affects the 
evaluation of performance.  
 Empirical results from studies on performance are mixed: objective performance is as 
far from an effective measure for trust as perceived performance is. Primary research findings 
on performance are: 1. Trust in governmental institutions is primarily shaped by perceptions 
of economic and political performance (Espinal, et al, 2006: 200) 2. Good institutional 
performance enhances civic morality and trust (Letki, 2006: 320) 3. Citizens’ perception of 
government performance influences satisfaction across diverse federal agencies and fosters 
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trust in those agencies (Morgeson and Petrescu 2011: 471). 4. Economic performance is less 
relevant for trust than political performance (Newton 2006: 895). 
 The choice made is not to study complete political performance, but to examine how 
the crisis performance, conducted by the governments, is perceived by the Eurozone citizens. 
The expectation is that crisis performance will be a good indicator for trust. Based on the 
literature the hypothesis will be:  
 H4. If the crisis performance of the government is positively evaluated, this should 
 lead to trust in the government.  
The fourth hypothesis will be tested on crisis performance by national and EU governments in 
combination with trust in national and EU governments.      
Problem solving capacity 
 Another political factor which might have influence on trust is the problem solving 
capacity of government. In prior research problem solving capacity is never linked to trust. 
Research on problem solving capacity is mainly focussed on voting behaviour. The allocated 
competence of parties for solving economic problems is a predictor for voting behaviour 
(Maier and Rattinger, 2004: 211; Callier, 2010:1015). If a relationship exists between problem 
solving capacities of the government and governmental trust, then this would be interesting to 
examine.  Arguments in favour of this reasoning would be that if governments are capable to 
deal effectively with the economic crisis, this might influence the trust people have in 
government. The rationale might be that when governments aren’t thought to be capable of 
solving the crisis, because they don’t have the tools, skills, experience or competences, trust 
might decline, because government failed before. Another possibility is that when 
governments are seen as best suited actors for solving the crisis, but citizens don’t expect 
them to act accordingly, in which case trust might drop as well.  
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Note that due to the fact that problems solving has never been linked to trust, the 
assumptions made are based on speculation. The possible direction of the relationship can 
only be guessed by using the results on voting behaviour and problem solving capacity as a 
proxy. Even so the following hypothesis is stated:  
H5 If citizens think that the government is most capable in solving the economic 
 problems this will lead to more trust in the government.   
The fifth hypothesis will be tested for problem solving capacity of the national and EU 
government in combination with the trust in national and EU government.      
Economical explanations 
Another explanation of citizens’ trust in government points towards the real economy.  
A failing economic is often seen as the plausible source of declining trust in government 
(Lawrence, 1997: 130; Ross and Escobar-Lemmon, 2011:416). Yet research by Bok (1997: 
61) showed that the real economic performance, GDP, and employment are insufficient 
measures for trust, since the expectations of citizens are often too high and government can’t 
meet these expectations. At the aggregated country level trust seem to be indeed affected by 
inflation, unemployment and debt Roth (et al 2011: 20). Still, if these effects will be present at 
individual level as a predictor of trust, it needs to be examined. In order to test whether real 
economic conditions do affect trust, a “relative unemployment” measure is taken into account.  
Subjective economic conditions and the perceived status of the economy, is in many 
cases a better measure of trust (Lawrence, 1997: 130). Citizens will experience the economic 
crises differently; therefore their evaluation will be different. The perceived evaluation of the 
national and EU economy will be tested in order to see whether subjective economic 
evaluation affects individual trust levels. Expected is that the real economic indicators and 
subjective economic evaluations both influence trust. Based on the literature it is expected 
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that subjective economic evaluations will have more influence on trust than real economic 
indicators.  
Personal explanations 
During an economic crisis people can experience very strong emotions. When the continuity 
of daily life routines are shattered or are threatened to be shattered, then trust will be 
undermined (Giddens, 1990:98). Feelings of uncertainty and insecurity are therefore related to 
trust. Security “is safeguarding the opportunities for people to build their strengths and 
aspirations” (Wills-Herrera, et al. 2009: 89). Insecurity leads to declining opportunities to 
build their strength and aspirations. If government can’t provide a secure basis for citizens to 
develop themselves, then citizens will distrust government. Previous research showed that 
when citizens experience great uncertainty during economic crisis the more likely it is that 
negative perceptions on political institutions will predominate (Jones, 2009: 1085). 
 Feelings of insecurity regarding personal employment are strongly related to distrust 
(Nannestad and Paldam, 1994, p. 215).  Distrust and unemployment are strongly related 
because losing a job means, losing a bit of your identity. Governments are often held 
responsible for this loss, because they need to safeguard these economic conditions (Mughan 
& Lacy 2002: 516). Research showed that people that feel insecure and anxious blame the 
government rather than the deeper economic forces (Nye, 1997:12).  Thus, if future 
(economic) expectations are insecure, then trust should drop according to the literature. The 
hypothesis which is derived from the literature is: 
 H6 If citizens feel certain on the future economic expectations of their country and 
 their personal situation, they will trust national and EU government more than 
 people who feel uncertain on these situations.  
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In order to test the hypothesis on future expectations of citizens, the expected 
developments regarding the following situations are tested: 1) situation economy country,  
2) employment situation country, 3) financial situation household and  
4) personal job situation.   
 Even though it is expected that the economic crisis mostly affects trust, there are other 
non crisis related factors that can explain political trust at individual level. Other personal 
(non crisis) factors that might influence trust are gender, political interest, social status and 
life satisfaction. Literature on the effects of gender on trust produces mixed and contradicting 
results. Research supports the claim that women display more political trust than men 
(Schoon and Cheng 2009:146; Anderson and Tverdova 2003:101; Schyns and Koop 2010: 
165; Mishler and Rose 1997: 438). These findings are contradicted by the studies of Newton 
(2007: 356) and Dogan (2005:14) they claim that gender does not significantly contribute to 
trust. Therefore clear expectations on gender in relation to trust cannot be stated.  
  The second personal factor that influences trust is political interest. Political interest 
and political distrust are found to be negatively related to each other (Catterberg and Moreno, 
2006: 43). Individuals that are interested in politics are more willing to trust political 
institutions and politicians than individuals who are not interested in politics. In this study it is 
expected that political interest will influence trust positively.  
 The third personal factor that influences trust is social status. People from lower social 
standing show less political trust (Schoon and Cheng, 2009: 149; Warren 1999:8).  
The upper-class were more favorable in evaluating the system and showed higher levels of 
trust. (Anderson and Tverdova 2003:101). The same conclusion is found by Newton; trust is 
more frequently expressed by the upper-class in society than by the lower class (2001: 204). 
For this study it is expected that social status will positively influence trust. 
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 The last personal factor that is said to influence trust is life satisfaction. People with 
high life satisfaction are more trusting (Orren, 1997: 105; Delhey and Newton 2003: 96). 
Trust is hence seen as a product of positive adult life experiences. Unfortunately the opposite 
also holds true, negative life experience and dissatisfaction with life foster distrust (Delhey 
and Newton 2003:96). It is expected that in this study life satisfaction does positively 
influence trust. The above mentioned personal factors; gender, political interest, social status 
and life satisfaction, will be included in this study even though these factors are not related to 
the crisis. Due to the fact that gender produces mixed outcomes, hence only the other 
explanatory factors are included in the hypothesis. Derived from the literature the hypothesis 
is: 
 H7. More political interest, higher social status and more life satisfaction will lead to 
 more trust in the government  
3. Data 
Research method and case selection 
In order to examine trust in national and EU governments, this study will make use of the 
cross-sectional study that is conducted biannually by the Eurobarometer on behalf of the 
European Commission. Information on whether there indeed is a drop of trust during the 
European sovereign debt crisis and if so, whether trust between national and EU governments 
are related were gathered by using the biannual spring and autumn surveys from 2001 to 
2011. Data concerning economic indicators are from Eurostat. Data on inflation rates are 
based on the annual HICP indicator from Eurostat3, data on unemployment 4 and government 
                                                 
3 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&language=en&pcode=tec00118&tableSelection=1&foot
notes=yes&labeling=labels&plugin=1 
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debt5 were retrieved from Eurostat and matched to the time that corresponded with the 
Eurobarometer data. 
  The possible predictors of trust during the economic crisis are measured using 
Eurobarometer survey 75.3 May 2011 (pre-release). A major limitation of this study is that it 
is impossible to examine all the selected predictors in multiple time sets because the variables 
on crisis performance and problem solving capacities were only asked in Eurobarometer 75.3.  
The unit of analysis for the first part of this analysis is the 27 member state countries6 
of the EU. To examine whether there is a difference between the drop of trust in eurozone and 
non-eurozone countries, the group will be split into eurozone7 and  
non-eurozone countries8. Since the eurozone countries are bound financially by the euro and 
therefore the obligations regarding the EU are different the effects of the crisis could be 
different. The unit of analyses for the second research question is the citizens of the 17 
eurozone countries of the European Union. This group is chosen because, when one or two 
eurozone countries are in danger, the effect will be most negative for other eurozone 
countries, since it can degrade the value of the euro. This can have a domino effect on other 
EU countries. Counties outside the eurozone, are not bound to the euro and therefore the debt 
crisis will affect them differently.   
                                                                                                                                                        
4 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=une_rt_a&lang=en 
 
5 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tipsgo20 
 
6 EU members: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus,  the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.   
 
7 Eurozone countries: : Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain 
  
8 Non-Eurozone countries:  Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
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This study will be of comparative nature for the first and second research question and 
will start with a bird’s eye view. From there it will explore, in more depth, the different 
components. The first part of this study will examine all 27 member states together at 
aggregated level, followed by an examination of trust in eurozone and non-eurozone 
countries, and an examination of the countries individually, all at aggregated level. This will 
produce a better insight in trust at the aggregated country level.  In order to examine trust at 
the individual level, the focus group will be all residents of the seventeen eurozone counties 
and their opinion on the crisis. This will provide a better insight in the origin of individual 
trust during an economic crisis.   
The sample size of the Eurobarometer datasets used in this study varies. The complete 
sample of all countries is around  27.000 respondents. This complete and first sample will be 
used to answer the first research question. The second sample to answer the second research 
question (the eurozone sample) consists of 16.256 respondents.  
For every selected country approximately 1.000 respondents are included in this sample. All 
respondents in this second sample are residents of the seventeen eurozone countries, nationals 
and non-nationals, but EU-citizens and aged 15 years and over. 
The Eurobarometer uses a multi-stage random (probability) sampling design. The 
Eurobarometer selects the cases in every region of the country, yet weighted on population 
size and urbanization. The starting addresses were selected at random. Interviews were 
conducted face-to-face, and a CAPI (Computer Assisted Personal Interview) was used in the 
countries where this technique was available (Eurobarometer 75.3: metadata study 
description).   
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Operationalization and Measurement  
In this study, political trust on national and EU level will be our dependent (or outcome) 
variable. This study will focus on systemic political trust; in other words the trust citizens 
have in their institutions (Roth, 2009: 203).  National and EU governments are the political 
actors who deal with the Euro-crisis and therefore studying these institutions and their trust 
levels seems more than reasonable. By limiting the study to only these two institutions, 
information on trust in other specific institutions such as the European Central Bank is lost.  
Trust in National and EU governments is assessed by asking the following question:  
“I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For 
each of the following institutions (national and EU government), please tell me if you tend to 
trust it or tend not to trust it”.  The Eurobarometer data delivers three categories for answers, 
tend to trust, tend not to trust it and don’t know. The problem with binary variables is that the 
subtlety is missing. As Newton describes, “trust is a variable that ranges along a continuum, 
we do not either trust or distrust but do so in various degree” (2007:344). To see whether 
there is a loss of trust, ‘net trust’ is also examined by using Eurobarometer data from  
2001-2011. In line with the conclusion that: “the best measure of trust seems to be ‘net trust’, 
which is obtained by subtracting the percentage of those who trust from those who do not 
trust the institution” (Roth et al., 2011:7)9. The measure for the individual level of analysis is 
a dichotomous measure of trust, whereby the “don’t know” category will be added to the 
“don’t trust” category. This choice is made because the focus will specifically be on the 
people who trust during times of crisis. A “don’t know" answer can be seen as a negative 
answer. The coding of trust is as follows: 0= don’t trust and 1= do trust government. 
                                                 
9 “This approach is used in public opinion research in particular and is able to control for the fluctuations in the 
DK answers. The same approach of using net trust was also chosen by Gros and Roth (2010), and by Roth (2009 
and 2011)” (Roth et al. 2011:7). 
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The three main independent variables measured are: perceived crisis performance, 
problem solving capacity and uncertainty. This research will focus on perceived performance, 
because the perceptions of the public may vary from the real state of economic performance 
(Jones, 2009:1097). The first independent variable government performance during crisis time 
is measured using the following question: “Since the beginning of the economic crisis, would 
you say that each of the following actors has acted effectively or not to combat the crisis up 
till now?” This can be answered on a 5 point scale ranging from “yes, very effectively”, “yes, 
fairly effectively”, “no, not very effectively”, to “no, not at all effectively”, and “don’t know”. 
These crisis performance questions were asked for the national and the EU governments. This 
study uses a recoded version of this variable where 1= “yes, very effectively”, 0,75= “yes, 
fairly effectively”, 0,5= “don’t know” 0,25= “no, not very effectively” and 0= “no, not at all 
effectively”. The “don’t know” category is treated as a neutral middle point. The limitation is 
that this variable does not measure government performance as a whole, but merely 
government crisis performance. 
 The second independent variable measured is which institution is considered to be 
best capable of solving the economic crisis. The question asked is: “In your opinion, which of 
the following is best able to take effective actions against the effects of the financial and 
economic crisis?” the possible answers are: “1. The National Government. 2. The EU, 3. The 
United States, 4. The G20 5. IMF. 6 Others 7. None 8. Don’t Know (and 9. INAP)”. The 
variables need to be transformed into dichotomous variables, to make them ready for 
assessment, hereby “0” represents not best actor and “1” represents best actor for solving the 
crisis. This is done for the first and second answer, national government and EU government. 
The other variables are also set on 0.  
  The third variable that will be tested is uncertainty and future expectations. The first 
series of questions is focused on the expectations people have for the upcoming next twelve 
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months. Taken into account are the variables: expected economic situation country, expected 
employment situation country, financial situation household and employment situation. The 
questions asked are:  “What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next 
twelve months be better, worse or the same, when it comes to your… 1) economic situation in 
our country, 2) the employment situation in our country,  3) financial situation in your 
household and 4) your personal job situation?” The answers are given on a four point scale 
with a scale ranging from “better”, “worst”, “same", to “don’t know”. All these answers need 
to be refigured in order to make a three points scale ranging from 0=“worst”, 0,5= “same”, to 
1= “better”. The order of the scale is reversed for reasons of congruency and interpretation of 
analysis. The “don’t know” category is treated as a neutral middle point (0,5). 
As shown in the literature review political trust is often linked to a multitude of 
explanatory variables, which do differ from the level of analysis. Because the literature is 
inconclusive whether these variables do have an effect on political trust, we will take some of 
these variables into account as control variables. A limitation to the use of Eurobarometer data 
is that only some of the aforementioned potential control variables are available in 
Eurobarometer survey 75.3. A selection of control variables limited to present control 
variables in the data will therefore be tested: life satisfaction, perceived situation national and 
EU economy, gender, social status, political interest and unemployment. The downside of 
using standard surveys is in this case that not all (possible) explanatory variables were asked, 
thus controlling the other potential control variables: corruption, media negativity, religiosity, 
interpersonal trust, unstable regime, inequality, efficacy and support for regime are in this 
case impossible. Leaving these potential explanatory variables out of the analysis needs to be 
considered as a limitation of this research.  
The control variables are recoded in the following way: 1) life satisfaction, is recoded 
into 1= “very satisfied”, 0,75= “fairly satisfied”, 0.5= “neutral”, 0,25= “not very satisfied” 
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and 0= “very good”, 0,75= “rather good”, 0,5= “neutral”, 0,25= “rather good”, 0= “bad”. 2) 
political interest is recoded into 1= “very interested”, 0,66= “fairly interested”, 0,33= “not 
very interested”, 0= “not at all interested”. The socio-demographic control variables used are 
gender and social status. In gender female is coded as 0, and male is coded as 1. Social status 
has three categories: low social status is scored as 0, middle social status is scored as 0,5 and 
high social status is scored as 1.   
The real economic variable included is a relative unemployment measure, based on 
Eurostats year 2011. Countries unemployment rates are divided into three categories:  
1= “below EU average (unemployment between 0-7)”, 0,5= “around the EU average 
(unemployment between 7.1-12)”,  0= “and above EU average (unemployement above 12.1)”. 
Countries that belong to the “below” category are: Malta, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Austria. Countries that belong to the “around” category are: France, Italy, 
Finland, Cyprus and Slovenia. Countries that belong to the above category are: Greece, Spain, 
Ireland, Portugal, Estonia and Slovakia. Country dummies were tested with as baseline model 
the country of Germany. All categories are rescaled into 0 to 1 range in order to compare the 
odds ratio’s in the logistic regression. 
The data used to examine the first research question is derived from the biannually 
held standard Eurobarometer and Eurostat in the chosen timeframe between spring 2001- to 
spring 2011. The drop of trust will be examined by extracting the net trust of the countries. 
The relationship between trust and economic indicators during the different crises are 
examined with a bivariate correlation, where trust is measured by change in net trust, inflation 
is the change in inflation and debt is the change in debt in point difference in four different 
timeframes: 1) autumn 2004- spring 2011, 2) autumn 2004 - spring 2007, 3) autumn 2007- 
spring 2009 and 4) autumn 2010-spring 2011.  
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Scatterplots are utilized to provide a clear picture on country level of the change in 
trust in combination with the change in unemployment or the change in government debt in 
percentages, between 2004 and 2011. 
 Linear trend lines are examined in order to see whether the change in time is 
responsible for a decline in trust. A bivariate regression is used in order to support the results 
of the trend lines. The relationship between trust in national and EU government is tested by a 
correlation, for each country individually and for the complete eurozone sample as a whole.  
 The data used to examine the second research question is derived from the 
Eurobarometer 75.3 (2011) and will be used for a secondary analysis.  Due to the fact that the 
outcome variable trust is a binary measure and therefore the assumptions of ordinary least 
square regression do not apply, a logistic regression analysis will be used to test the second 
research question and the corresponding hypotheses. Control variables will be taken into 
account to increase the predictability of the model. 
4. Empirical Results  
A cross national examination of the drop of trust during the economic crisis 
Fluctuations in trust are often linked to the economic conditions where countries are in, 
especially when countries are in recession trust is said to be declining (Lawrence, 1997: 130). 
Between 2007 and 2011, the European economy was hit twice by a large scale economic 
crisis. The first economic crisis was the credit crunch also called the credit crisis, which 
originated in America in the summer of 2007, but influenced the world and EU economy as 
well. In the beginning of 2009, the American economy started slow recovery. European 
economy on contrary made a downfall, due to the sovereign debt crisis. The debt crisis is still 
continuing and the policy made to solve the crisis, has not yet had produced wanted outcome. 
The European sovereign debt crisis made it difficult and in some cases even impossible for 
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some countries in the eurozone to re-finance their public debt without the assistance of third 
parties. Due to this crisis, the euro and the economy are under pressure and multiple measures 
are taken to stabilize the European economy. Following the literature that economic 
conditions (Lawrence, 1997:130) do have an effect on trust we expect that trust levels are 
affected in times of crisis.  
 In order to test the first research question and corresponding hypotheses, levels of trust 
are related to economic data. The first examination of the trust levels showed that trust 
fluctuates and that there are different peaks and troughs in figure 1. 
Figure 1. Net trust of all 27 EU members states from spring 2001 to spring 2011 
* From 2001- to 2003 the following countries represented the EU:  Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Italy, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, UK, Portugal, Spain, Finland, Sweden. In 2004 (Expansion one) the following 
countries joined the EU:  Cyprus, Estland, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic 
joined the EU. In 2007  (expansion two) Bulgaria and Romania became members.   
 In 2001 there is a peak in trust in national and EU government that is often linked to 
the terrorist attack on the twin towers (Dalton, 2005: 151, Hetherington and  Rudolph, 2008: 
498), where trust in own institutions grew merely due to the risk that was perceived from 
outside. After the peak of 2001, trust in national and EU government declined until autumn 
2003. Trust seems to recover until autumn 2004, followed by a decline until spring 2005. 
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From there onwards trust grew, with a sharp increase from autumn 2006 and a peak around 
spring 2007. In autumn 2007, the global economic market declined, with a particularly sharp 
downturn in 2008, in this same time period trust in national and EU government also dropped 
significantly. Between spring 2007 and spring 2008, trust in national government dropped for 
the “15 original countries” with -24 point (net trust scale), while trust in the EU dropped -10,7 
points. The countries that became member in 2004, exhibit the same pattern; trust in national 
government dropped with -10,4 points while trust in EU dropped less steeply with -3,2 points. 
Different patterns occur when examining the countries that became member in 2007, trust in 
national government dropped very little, -1,1 point while trust in the EU government grew 
considerably with 6,2 points.  
 In autumn 2009, trust in the EU seemed to be rising again, this coincides with the 
American economic rescue plan “American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, and the 
European austerity measures and the €200 billion stimulus plans of Europe. At the end of 
2009 and the beginning of 2010, fears of a sovereign debt crisis started to develop among 
investors, as a result of the rising of the private and governmental debt levels led to 
downgrading of governmental debt in some Europeans states, combined with the degrading of 
the credit ratings of banks led to the sovereign debt crisis. Between autumn 2009 and spring 
2010 at the start of the debt crisis, trust in national and EU government dropped. In the 
countries that where already member before 2003, trust in national government dropped with 
-15,7 points, and trust in the EU dropped with -13,3 points. In the countries that became 
member in 2004 we see the same patterns; trust in national government dropped with -10,0 
points and trust in the EU dropped with -12,1 point. Different patterns emerge when looking 
at the countries who became member in 2007. In these countries trust in national government 
dropped slightly with -2,5 points and trust in the EU grew with 2,4 point. In autumn 2010, 
trust in the EU grew, while trust in national government shrunk further. In spring 2011, trust 
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in national governments seems to be recovering again, whilst trust in the EU government is 
further eroding.  
 Trust in the eurozone and non eurozone countries are examined separately, due to the 
fact that the economic crisis might have a different impact on both of them. Primary results in 
figure 2 confirm the difference in the effect that the crisis has on trust in eurozone and non-
eurozone countries.  
 In spring 2007 trust in national and EU government peaked for the eurozone countries 
and in the non-eurozone countries. Trust in EU government in the non-eurozone countries 
also peaked, while trust in national government stayed almost equal. In autumn 2007, during 
the credit crunch, there is a sharp decline in trust in the national and EU government for the 
eurozone countries, and a lesser sharp decline for non-eurozone countries. 
During the beginning of sovereign debt crisis, between autumn 2009 and spring 2010, 
trust in the EU and in national government are both in a “relatively steep” decline in the 
eurozone countries. The opposite happened in the non-eurozone countries were trust in 
national government grew and trust in the EU declined. The lowest point of trust in national 
government for the eurozone countries in this timeframe is in 2010, while at the same time, 
trust in the EU government seems to be slightly recovering. Trust in the national governments 
is restoring in spring 2011, while trust in the EU is deteriorating in the eurozone countries. 
During the credit crunch and the sovereign debt crisis the net trust level in the EU 
dropped -33,1 points in the eurozone countries. The non-eurozone countries also experienced 
a drop of trust in the EU of -21,8 points. Trust in the national government was more affected 
in the eurozone countries than in the non eurozone countries. Trust in national government 
dropped 37,7 points in the eurozone countries and for the non- eurozone considerably less 
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with -18,5 points. At countries’ individual levels, it becomes apparent that most countries 
experienced a drop of trust during the two economic crises10.  
Figure 2. Net trust in eurozone and non-eurozone countries 
 
 
 
The drop of trust can be calculated by measuring the difference between the starting 
point of the crisis in 2007 to the lowest point that is reached until 2011. When examining the 
results of the changes in trust in all individual countries (table 1), it becomes clear that except 
for Austria, Sweden, Luxembourg, and Bulgaria, trust levels in all national governments 
dropped during the economic crisis, and except for Bulgaria, trust in the EU dropped for all 
                                                 
10 For the individual graphs refer to appendix 1. 
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examined countries. It needs to be noted that during the credit crunch trust indeed dropped 
sharply in Sweden: -10,4%, Luxembourg: -12,1% and Austria: -17,4 at national level, yet 
trust levels recovered quickly and in autumn 2008 levels of trust where considerably higher 
than the period (2003- to 2006) before the economic crisis. For five EU countries (The 
Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, Finland and Denmark) the levels of trust in the EU, are lower 
in 2003 to 2006 than in the period between 2007 to 2011, still all these countries experienced 
a drop of trust during the crisis.   
The first hypothesis (H1), can be confirmed, when the eurozone is hit by the credit and 
debt crisis, trust did decline. Directly after the news that the economy was hit by a crisis trust 
in national and EU government dropped considerably especially in the eurozone. 
Table 1. The maximum drop of trust measured in national and EU government for 27 EU countries in the time period 2007- 
2011 
 
 
 
 Country                        Trust national government                trust EU 
Eurozone 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Belgium 
-37.7 
 
-54,4 
-33,1 
 
-35,4 
Germany -28,8 -37,9 
Greece -51,7 -65,4 
Spain  -69 -51,6 
France -39,6 -28,3 
Ireland -49 -32,7 
Italy -31,1 -31,5 
Luxembourg 20 -25,5 
The Netherlands -47,2 -33,7 
Portugal -51 -45 
Austria 5,1 -20,2 
Finland -55,1 -24,8 
Cyprus  -39,5 -29 
Estonia -59,5 -21,6 
Malta -20,4 -23,2 
Slovakia -23,3 -12,3 
Slovenia -47,4 -44 
Non-eurozone countries  
 
Denmark 
-18,5 
 
-56,3 
-21,8 
 
-26,1 
 Bulgaria 13,6 2,1 
Czech Republic -26,6 -30,2 
Hungary -26 -20,3 
Latvia  -13,1 -27,4 
Lithuania -30,8 -22,5 
Poland -21,2 -22,8 
Romania -17,5 -25,8 
Sweden 18,6 -25,8 
UK -26 -19,5 
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 Did trust spiral into a vicious circle of decline (Patternson, 1999:151)? Or are trust 
levels more fluctuating over time and affected by multiple causes instead of only a product of 
changing times? By examining the linear trend lines, and a bivariate regression between time 
and trust it becomes evident that the drop of trust cannot be explained by the time alone.  In 
figure one the net trust of the member states is portrayed. When examining the linear trend 
lines of the EU members the first impression is that lines indeed show “a vicious circle of 
decline”, yet the linear trend line of trust in national government of Bulgaria and Hungary 
show a growth instead of a decline. The linear trendlines of the countries individually also 
show different trends among these countries (see appendix one and table 2).   
Table 2. Linear trends in 27 EU countries   
 Trust EU Trust National Government
Trend line positive  
 
Non Eurozone countries, 
Belgium, Austria, Finland, 
Denmark, Sweden, Estonia, 
Slovakia 
 
Germany, The Netherlands, 
Austria, Sweden, Slovakia, 
Poland 
Trend line negative  Eurzone Countries Germany, 
Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Poland, UK, 
Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia, Chez 
Republic, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania  
Eurozone countries, non 
Eurozone countries, Belgium, 
Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, 
Finland, Denmark, UK, Cyprus, 
Estionia, Malta, Slovenia, Chez 
Republic, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania  
 
 The second hypothesis, that the decline of trust is best described as a general trend, 
can be rejected. A considerable amount of countries do have a negative trend of trust in EU 
and national government, but there are also exceptions that show a positive trend during the 
time period 2001 to 2011. The bivariate regression between trust in the eurozone and time 
(table 3) described that time is not significantly related to change in trust. This leads to the 
conclusion, that there is no relationship between time and trust and that no general trend of 
decline can be found for the eurozone countries between 2001 to 2011. Concluding that there 
is no evidence that all European countries are spiraling into a vicious circle of decline in trust 
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(Patterson, 1999:151) and it seems that trust is more fluctuating over time (Bovens and Wille, 
2008:52). 
Table 3. Bivariate regression to examine whether time changes aggregated trust over time   
 Trust national government 
 B SE ß B SE ß
Constant 
 
Time 2001-2011 
 
-1,7 
 
-.077 
3,78 
 
0,350 
 
 
-0.485n.s. 
 16,78 
 
-0,21 
3,735 
 
0,345n.s 
 
R² 
Adjusted R² 
0,24 
0,19 
      
*p<0.01 
**p<0.05 
***p<0,001 
 
By adding economic data it becomes possible to see if trust is related to economic 
conditions. The economic indicators used are inflation, unemployment and government debt. 
The result in table four shows that inflation is not significantly correlated to trust in national 
and EU governments in the combined timeframe and separate timeframes. Unemployment is 
very strongly correlated to trust in the national government, in the time period 2004- 2011,  
the correlation is significant and strong (-0,623**). In the time period before the crisis (2004-
2007) unemployment is not significantly correlated to trust in EU government, but mildly 
correlated (-0,325*) to trust in the national government. In the following time period when the 
credit crunch hit Europe and America, unemployment can be strongly correlated to trust in 
national government (-0,57***) but not to the trust in EU government. In the period of the 
sovereign debt crisis, trust is highly correlated to trust in national (-0,62**) and EU 
government (0,725***).  Government debt is correlated to trust in national government 
(0,457**), but only in the timeframe 2004-to 2011. In the other individual timeframes debt 
seems not to be of any influence on trust in national and EU government. There is no 
evidence of a relation between inflation and trust. Notable is that the correlation between trust 
and unemployment becomes stronger during times of crisis than in the period before the 
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crisis. These findings only partially correspond with the finding of Roth (et al: 2011: 20). In 
this research there is no evidence found that inflation and debt are related to trust but the 
relationship between unemployment and trust can be confirmed. Therefore the conclusion 
follows that unemployment is the only economic indicator that is related to trust in national 
government in all timeframes. This is followed by the finding that during the sovereign debt 
crisis there is a strong relation between trust in the EU and unemployment,  
a relationship that is not observed prior to or during the credit crisis. 
 
Table 4. Correlation between change in trust in EU and national government, and economic indicators (eurozone 
sample) 
 Trust national government Trust EU government 
 Autumn 
2004- 
Spring 
2011 
Autumn 
2004- 
Spring 
2007 
Autumn 
2007-  
Spring 
2009  
Autumn 
2010- 
Spring 
2011   
Autumn 
2004- 
Spring 
2011 
Autumn 
2004- 
Spring 
2007 
Autumn 
2007-  
Spring 
2009 
Autumn 
2010- 
Spring 
2011   
Inflation 0,2 -0,05 0,399 0,14 0,10 0,277 0,05 -0,19 
 
Unemployment 
 
Government 
Debt 
-0,623** 
 
-0,457** 
-,325* 
 
-0,299 
-,57*** 
 
-,14 
-0,62** 
 
-,43 
0,23 
 
0,19 
-0,39 
 
-0,15 
-,30 
 
-,179 
0,725*** 
 
-3,22 
          
Number of countries 17                      
*p<0.01 
**p<0.05 
***p<0,001 
 
The idea that trust is related to economic indicators should mean that countries that are 
hit hard economically should display equal strong percentage changes in trust.  
When examining figure three it becomes apparent, that even though almost all countries 
experience a drop of trust, not all countries had experienced economic decline. First findings 
suggest that the drop of trust in national government cannot be explained by unemployment 
rates or governmental debt alone. Countries such as Belgium and Finland have experienced a 
great loss of trust in their own governments, still their change in unemployment and 
government debt (in percentages) is relatively stable. The opposite is true for countries such 
as Estonia and Ireland, both displayed great negative percentage changes in their 
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unemployment and debt rates, still trust in EU government did not change as much in 
comparison to other countries with economic problems. In countries where the unemployment 
rates declined, Germany and Austria, trust in EU government was still affected negatively and 
for Germany trust in national government declined as well. Concluding that countries that are 
hit hardest by the crisis do not necessarily have the greatest loss of trust and even countries 
that did not economically suffer during the crisis still lost a considerable amount of trust.  
Hypothesis 3 Trust is related to economic conditions such as inflation, unemployment 
and debt can be partially rejected. Unemployment seems to be the only indicator that shows a 
relationship between trust in national government (all time series), and a relation to trust in 
the EU only during the debt crisis. A more in-depth research showed that even countries that 
have relatively low debts and no growing unemployment rates experienced a considerable 
loss in trust during the crisis. Thus economic indicators alone, inflation, debt and 
unemployment cannot explain all the negative changes in trust at country level.  
Figure 3. Drop of trust in national government and changes in unemployment rate in percentages  
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The research question whether there is a drop of trust during the credit crisis and 
sovereign debt crisis, and if so is it related to economic factors or whether it is part of a more 
general trend of decline, can be answered. There is a drop of trust during the credit crisis and 
sovereign debt crisis. The findings show that this drop is not related to a more general trend of 
decline. Unemployment is the only economic indicator that is related to trust in national 
government, other economic indicators are not related to trust in national government.  
 The next part of this research examines if trust in national and EU government are 
related, and whether this relationship is of congruent or compensational. Table five displays 
the patterns of trust of all EU countries, between 2010 and 2011. When examining the 
patterns of the trust, it becomes evident that four different patterns occur. The first pattern: 
trust in the EU and national governments are rising. The second pattern: trust in the EU and 
national governments are both declining. The third pattern: trust in national government is 
growing while trust EU is declining. The fourth pattern: trust in the EU is growing while trust 
in national government declines. 
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Table 5. Patterns of trust from autumn 2010 to spring 2011 
Patterns of trust in all 27 
member countries 
Trust EU grows  Trust in EU declines  
Trust in National 
government grows  
Belgium, France, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Austria, Finland, 
UK, Cyprus, Malta, Romania 
(EU-27, Eurozone) 
Germany, Spain, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Estonia, 
Denmark , Poland  
Trust in national declines 
 
Sweden (Non-Eurozone countries) 
Greece, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria
 
When looking at table five it becomes clear that, depending on the situation, and time 
period, patterns change, and trust in national and EU can change in the same direction and 
also in different directions. As mentioned in the literature, there are two theories related to the 
relationship between trust in national government and trust in EU government.  
First, the “congruence model” developed by Anderson (1998: 576), were citizens do not 
develop independent judgments on the European institutions; they use their opinions on 
domestic attitudes to form an opinion on the European institution.  
The second theory, based on the “compensation model” by Kritzinger (2003) claims the 
opposite, namely that confidence in, and satisfaction with national institutions will hinder 
support for the European Union. Because time series alone are not adequate enough to 
conclude whether there indeed is a relationship between trust in the EU and national 
government, cause and effect cannot be determined. 
A correlation between trust in national and EU government (2001-2011) was 
conducted to test the relation between national and EU government. The results in table six 
show that most countries display the same strong correlations between trust in national and 
EU government. Exceptions are: Belgium, Luxembourg and Finland where no relation was 
found between trust in national and EU government. In Germany trust in national and EU 
government is significantly correlated, yet the strength of the correlation is weaker in 
comparison to the other countries examined.  
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The second research question whether there is a relationship between trust in national 
and EU government can be answered positively for most eurozone countries. Most countries 
display a relation between trust in national and EU government. The only exceptions are 
Belgium Luxembourg and Finland. The relationship between trust in national and EU 
government is in all cases except for Finland a positive relationship, which corresponds best 
with the theory of Anderson (2003:576) the “congruence model”. When examining appendix 
one, it becomes apparent that for most EU countries the plotted net trust lines are moving in a 
congruent manner. Still, the direction of causality cannot be determined hence it cannot be 
concluded that the congruence model, fit the results completely. A better examination of this 
theory is necessary in order to make statements on which model fits best.  
Table 6. Correlation between trust in national and EU government (eurozone sample, 2001-2011) 
 Correlation  
Countries    Trust in national and EU government 
Belgium 
Germany 
   0,44 
0,59* 
Greece 
Spain 
France  
Ireland 
Italy  
Luxembourg  
Netherlands  
Portugal 
Austria 
Finland  
Cyprus 
Estonia 
Malta 
Slovenia 
Slovakia 
   0,84*** 
0,84*** 
0,70*** 
0.68*** 
0,74*** 
0,28 
0,67*** 
0,81*** 
0,69*** 
-0,71 
0,68*** 
0,37 
0,79*** 
0,74*** 
0,66*** 
 
Complete 
eurozone 
    
0,74*** 
     
Number of countries:  
Time periods:  
17
20 
    * p<0.01 
  ** p<0.05 
  *** p<0.001 
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Citizens trust in during the sovereign debt crisis in 2011 
In Spring 2011, a special Eurobarometer was lounged in order to test the public opinion on the 
economic crisis. The aim was to get insight in the public opinion concerning the sovereign 
debt crisis.   
 In 2011, forty-three percent of respondents did neither trust national government nor 
EU government. Eleven percent of the respondents did not trust their national government but 
did trust the EU government. Eighteen percent of the respondents did trust the EU 
government but did not trust the national government. Last, twenty-eight percent of the 
respondents did trust national and EU government (table 7). The largest group of respondents 
did not have any trust in national and EU government. Following the reasoning of Blind “that 
good governance in strengthens trust” (Blind: 2007:21), than this should mean that in 2011 
43% of the respondents have not experienced good governance.  
Table 7. Percentages of trust in national and EU government (cross-tabulation) 
  Trust in EU  
  Tend not to trust Tend to trust 
 
Trust in national government 
 
 
 
Total 
 
Tend not to trust 
 
Tend to trust 
 
7034 (43%) 
 
1743 (11%) 
 
2904 (18%)      
 
4575 (28%) 
 
16256 (100%) 
 
 
 To check for multicollinearity between national and EU government a simple 
correlation is conducted. The result show that trust in national and EU government are 
significantly correlated (0,42) (table 8) but there is no multicollinearity observed. Trust in 
national and EU government can therefore be treated as separate variables. 
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Table 8. Correlation between trust in national and EU government in 2011 at individual level 
 Correlation   
    Trust  EU government     
Trust national government    0,42***     
     
Number of countries 17         
*p<0.01 
**p<0.05 
**p<0.001 
 
In order to provide a better understanding in what explains trust in 2011, the next 
paragraph will use a logistic regression to test all (possible) explanatory variables for trust.  
Factors influencing citizens trust at individual level  
Trust has many forms and causes (Levi, 1998:79) and many factors are believed to influence, 
enhance or weaken trust. This study focuses on political, economical factors and personal 
factors to explain trust. The focus by the political factors lies with crisis performance and the 
problem solving capacity of the governments. The focus by the personal factors lies with the 
insecurity and uncertainty people feel on the economic future. As mentioned earlier in the 
literature review, due to the complexity of the subject trust, other factors in the political, 
personal and economic categories will be taken into account. 
Government performance is often said to be the best predictor for governmental trust 
at individual bases (Bok, 1997: 61). In this study the focus lies on a very one-dimensional 
measure of performance, crisis performance. The results of the binary logistic regression 
(table 9) confirm that crisis performance is a strong predictor of trust. The odds for crisis 
performance are 9,74 for national government and 7,62 for EU government. When crisis 
performance of the national government is perceived as being very effective than it is 9,7 
times more like that people have trust in the national government than citizens who judge the 
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performance of government less positively. When the crisis performance of the EU is 
perceived as being effective than it is 7,2 times more likely that people have trust in the EU 
government, than citizens who judge the performance less positively. From all the variables 
included in this model, crisis performance is the strongest predictor of trust in national and 
EU government. This corresponds with previous findings that trust in governmental 
institutions is shaped by political performance (Espinal et al, 2006: 200) and it corresponds 
with the finding of Bok (1997:61) that government performance is one of the best indicators 
of trust.   
The hypothesis (4) that positive evaluated crisis performance leads to trust can be 
accepted. Crisis performance is a good measure for explaining trust in national and EU 
governments during economic crisis.  
The other political factor that is linked to the economic crisis was the problem solving 
capacity. The reasoning behind this factor is that if governments are seen capable of solving 
the economic problems trust will grow. Examining the results of the binary logistic regression 
(table 9) confirms that problem solving capacity has influence on trust. In contrast to 
performance, the influence of problem solving capacity on trust is very minimal. The odds for 
problem solving capacity are with 1,40 for national government and 1,78 for EU government 
a weak predictor for trust. Thus if citizens think that the national government is best actor for 
solving the crisis than it is 1,4 time more like that people trust national government than when 
they think that national government is not the best actor for solving the problem. When 
citizens think the EU is the best actor for solving the economic problems than it is 1,8 time 
more likely that they will trust EU government than those who consider the EU not the best 
actor.  
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The hypothesis (5) when governments are seen as the best actor for solving problems, 
trust will grow in these governments, can be accepted. It needs to be stated that even though 
problem solving capacity is of significant influence on trust, the effect is very minimal. 
Performance would be a better explanatory variable for trust. In contrast to the findings of 
Maier and Rattinger (2004:11), problem solving capacity is not a strong predictor for trust as 
it is for voting behavior. 
Economic explanations for trust 
The possible effects of economic influences cannot be ruled out during times of crisis.   
The economic indicators are divided in real indicators and subjective economic indicators.  
The real economic indicator included is the relative unemployment measure. When examining 
the regression (table 9) it becomes apparent that “unemployment” is significantly related to 
trust in national government (odd, 2,92) and even more to trust in EU government (odd, 3,11). 
Thus can be concluded that when citizens live in countries where the unemployment is below 
European average they will be 2,9 times more likely to trust national government and 3,2 
times more likely to trust EU government compared to citizens who live in countries where 
unemployment is higher.  
The subjective economic measures in this model are the perceived status of the 
national and European economy. Examination of this measure shows that the situation of the 
national economy is a significant predictor (odd, 4,25) of  trust in national government.  
The economic situation of Europe is also an significant predictor (odd, 3,66) of trust in EU 
government. When the national economy is perceived as being good it is 4,2 times more 
likely that people trust national government than those who judge it less positively. The same 
pattern occurs for trust in EU government. When the EU economy is perceived as being good 
it is 3,6 times more likely that people will trust government compared to those people who 
judge it to be less positively.  After (political) crisis performance, subjective economic 
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evaluation is the strongest predictor of trust. This corresponds with the finding of Newton 
(2006:895), that economic evaluations have less influence on trust than political (crisis) 
performance has.  The findings further correspond with the ideas of Bouckaert and Walle, 
(2003: 329) that the economy not only needs to be good, but also needs to be evaluated 
positively. The subjective evaluation of trust is often a tradeoff between reality and the 
expectations people have (Lawrence, 1997:130). In this case it means that the subjective 
evaluation of trust is better able to explain trust than the real economic indicator of trust.  
Personal factors and feelings of uncertainty. 
During times of crisis, the security of the economic situation in the future can be violated. 
When governments can’t provide a secure future basis, trust will be affected in a negative 
way. The opposite should hold as well; if government can secure peoples economic future 
trust would be higher for those peoples compared to those peoples who evaluate their 
economic future less prosperous. Of all tested situations where uncertainty plays a role, it 
becomes evident that of the four measures only two measures seem to affect trust  
(see table 9). Only the expected situation of the national economy (national odd, 2,02; EU 
odd, 1,494) and the employment situation in the country (national odd,1,60; EU odd, 1,44) 
played a role in predicting trust. The more personal economic situations such as the financial 
future of the household and the personal job situation are of no significance when predicting 
trust. The future situation of the country prevails over the more personal situation of the 
individual. This means that uncertainty regarding the economic climate in the country is of 
more influence than the direct influence of the crisis on the personal situation. When citizens 
evaluate the situation of the country to be good, they will trust national government 2,0 times, 
and EU government 1,5 times more than citizens who evaluate the situation more negatively. 
When citizens evaluated the employment situation of the country being good, they will trust 
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national government 1,6 times and EU government 1,4 times more than citizens who evaluate 
the situation more negatively.   
Striking is that these findings contradict earlier findings by Nannestad and Paldam 
(1994: 215).  Their research outcome was that the feeling of insecurity about the employment 
situation and the personal fear of losing a job were strong indicators of distrust. Vice versa 
this relationship does not seem to be valid; feeling secure about the personal job situation does 
not foster trust in national and EU government.  
The hypothesis (6) can be partly accepted; when citizens feel secure on the future 
economic expectations of the country, these citizens are more likely to trust compared to than 
when they feel insecure. Still, (in)security on the personal employment and financial situation 
does not influence trust. Concluding that even though the hypothesis can be partially 
accepted, the influences of uncertainties on trust are very minimal. Performance and 
economic conditions are better measures for explaining trust.  
Non crisis related personal explanations on trust in government 
In literature trust is linked to personal characteristics and traits. The research on gender and 
trust has produced mixed outcomes. Where one claims that women are more likely to trust 
than men (Schoon and Cheng 2009:146; Anderson and Tverdova 2003:101; Schyns and Koop 
2009:165; Mishler and Rose 1997: 438) other research claims that there is no proven 
relationship between gender and trust. The finding presented in this study correspond to the 
finding of Dogan (2005:14) and Newton (2007:356) that gender does not significantly 
contribute to trust in government.  No evidence is found that women display more trust in 
government then men.  
Political interest is said to positively influence trust; when people are more interested 
in politics they are more willing to trust government compared to those who are not 
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interested. Unfortunately the results of the regression (table 9) show that political interest is 
not related to trust. This means that the interested and informed citizens display the same 
distrust and trust as those citizens who are not interested. These findings contradict earlier 
findings by Caterberg and Moreno (2006:43) who claimed that political interest and trust 
where negatively correlated.  
 Trust is said to be more frequently expressed by the upper class than the lower class 
(Newton 2001:204). These findings by Newton correspond with the results of this regression 
(table 9). Social class significantly influences trust in national (odd, 1,36) and EU government 
(odd, 1,69) in a positive way. Meaning that citizens who belong to higher social status will be 
1,4 times more likely to trust national government and 1,7 times more likely to trust EU 
government, compared to citizens who are of lower social status. Again it needs to be stressed 
that the influence of social status is relatively weak in comparison to the influence of 
performance or the economic indicators.  
The last personal factor of this study is life satisfaction. Life satisfaction is often said 
to influence trust. People who are satisfied with their lives are more trusting people (Orren, 
1997:105; Delhey and Newton, 2003:96).  The result of the logistic regression (table 9) 
confirms these previous findings. Life satisfaction is of significant influence on trust in 
national government (odd, 2,20) and EU government (odd, 1,98). This means that if people 
feel satisfied with their life, they are 2,2 times more likely to trust national government and 
2,0 time more likely to trust EU government compared to those people who are less satisfied 
with their lives. These results correspond to the theory that people who are more satisfied with 
their lives are more trusting people and are also more trusting toward governments (Orren, 
1997:105; Delhey and Newton, 2003:96). Even though the results are of the influence on 
trust, the influence is weak in comparison to the influences of performance and economic 
factors.  
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 The last hypothesis which stated that more political interest, higher social status and 
more life satisfaction lead to more trust in the government can be partially confirmed. Gender 
and political interest do not significantly influence trust, but life satisfaction and social status 
do influence trust significantly. Life satisfaction and social status are less influential on trust 
than performance or the economic indicators are.   
 All above mentioned findings enable us to answer the last research question; will the 
perceived performance, problem solving capacity and feelings of  economic uncertainty have 
effect on the political trust in national and EU government during the economic crisis? The 
answer is that crisis performance is a strong predictor of trust in national and EU government.  
Crisis performance is the indicator with the highest odds and hence is the most influential 
indicator of this model on trust in national and EU government.  Problem solving capacity and 
uncertainty (countries economy and unemployment) are both of significant influence on trust 
in national and EU government, yet their effects are weak (both have relatively small odds). A 
better predictor of trust is the perceived state of the economy and the relative unemployment 
measure.  
Table 9. Logistic Regression, to test which predictor can explain the trust in government at individual level  
 
Predictor 
Trust national government Trust EU government 
 B SE Odds ratio 
(95%)
B SE Odds ratio 
(95%) 
Crisis performance       
National government  2,200 0,082 9,749*** 
(7,892-10,467) 
   
EU    1,983 0,076 7,262*** 
(6,260-8,425) 
Problem solving capacity       
National government 0,338 0,053 1,403*** 
(1,264-1,557) 
   
EU    0,580 0,044 1,787*** 
(1,639-1,948) 
Uncertainty       
Situation economy country 0,704 0,073 2,022*** 
(1,752-2,332) 
0,401 0,069 1,494*** 
(1,305-1,710) 
Situation employment country 0,471 0,071 1,602*** 
(1,395-1,840) 
0,367 0,087 1,444*** 
(1,265-1,648) 
Financial situation household 0,102 0,087 1,107 
(,934-1,312) 
0,251 0,081 1,285* 
(1,285-1,097) 
Personal job situation -,153 0,093 ,858  
(,715-1,030) 
0,656 0,087 1,072 
(0,904-1,271) 
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Predictor 
Trust national government Trust EU government 
 B SE Odds ratio 
(95%)
B SE Odds ratio 
(95%) 
Situation economy       
national  1,448 0,095 4,255*** 
(3,534-5,123) 
   
EU    1,297 0,079 3,659*** 
(3,132-4,275) 
Real economic factor 
Unemployment  
 
1,071 
 
0,093 
 
2,919*** 
(2,435-3,500) 
 
1,137 
 
0,90 
 
3,116*** 
(2,613-3,716) 
Personal factors       
Life satisfaction  0,704 0,086 2,2022*** 
(1,707-2,395) 
0,656 0,078 1,928*** 
(1,655-2,245) 
Political interest -,143 0,062 0,867 
(,768-0,979) 
0,193 0,057 1,213  
(1,084-1,357) 
Socio demographics       
Gender 1=male 0,046 ,039 1,047 
(,969-1,138) 
0,094 0,037 1,099 
(1,022-1,181) 
Social status 0,309 0,061 1,362*** 
(1,208-1,536) 
0,526 0,057 1,692*** 
(1,513-1,891) 
       
       
Country Dummies       
Belgium 
 
Greece 
 
Spain 
 
France 
 
Luxembourg 
 
Ireland 
 
Italy 
 
Netherlands 
 
Portugal 
 
Austria 
 
Finland 
 
Cyprus 
 
Malta 
 
Slovakia 
 
Slovenia  
 
Estonia 
0,111 
 
-,051 
 
-,361 
 
0,423 
 
1,532 
 
0,602 
 
-,392 
 
0,634 
 
-0,044 
 
0,850 
 
0,612 
 
0,939 
 
0,507 
 
-,262 
 
-,337 
 
0,724 
0,092 
 
0,124 
 
-,109 
 
0,101 
 
0,160 
 
0,108 
 
0,093 
 
0,094 
 
1,191 
 
0,094 
 
0,088 
 
,121 
 
,124 
 
,104 
 
0,114 
 
0,234 
1,117 
(0,933-1338) 
0,950 
,743-1,21) 
0,697** 
(0,563-0,863) 
1,526*** 
(1,253-1,789) 
4,628*** 
(3,384-6,328) 
1,825*** 
(1,476-2,257) 
0,676*** 
(0,563-0,811) 
1,885*** 
(1,569-2,266) 
0,975 
(0,784-1,167) 
2,340*** 
(1,944-2,815) 
1,845*** 
(1,553-2,191) 
2,557*** 
(2,016-3,242) 
1,660*** 
(1,301-2,118) 
0,769 
(0,628-0,943) 
0,714 
(0,517-0,893) 
3,261** 
(2,062-1,304) 
0,966 
 
-,103 
 
-,314 
 
0,674 
 
0,460 
 
-0,42 
 
0,38 
 
0,372 
 
0,220 
 
0,229 
 
0,278 
 
0,836 
 
0,811 
 
0,399 
 
0,417 
 
-0,869 
0,092 
 
0,101 
 
-,101 
 
0,096 
 
0,140 
 
0,106 
 
0,085 
 
0,092 
 
0,093 
 
0,093 
 
0,085 
 
,116 
 
,119 
 
,100 
 
0,093 
 
0,419 
2,628*** 
(2,196-3,146) 
0,903 
,728-1,19) 
0,730** 
(0,600-0,889) 
1,963*** 
(1,625-2,370) 
1,584*** 
(1,204-2,082) 
0,804 
(0,876-0,705) 
1,039 
(0,879-1,228) 
1,451*** 
(1,212-1,737) 
1,246 
(1,037-1,496) 
1,258 
(1,048-1,510) 
1,320* 
(1,117-1,561) 
2,307*** 
(1,839-2,895) 
2,307*** 
(1,839-2,895) 
1,491*** 
(1,225-1,814) 
1,517 
(1,265-1,820) 
(0,288-6,10)*** 
 
Constant -4,211 0,116 0,015*** --4,135 0,111 0.016*** 
N 
Nagelkerke R²   
Model chi square 
% correct predictions   
  15726 
0,372 
5043,900*** 
60,9%
  15727 
0,286 
3790,142*** 
53,6% 
*p<0.01 
**p<0.05 
***p<0,001 
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5. Conclusion and Discussion  
This research aimed to provide in a better understanding of trust during the sovereign debt 
crisis at aggregated country and at individual level. At both levels different explanations are 
given for governmental trust. At aggregated level previous research focuses most on political 
systems, aggregated corruption scales, trends in trust and the relevance of economic indicators 
such as inflation, governmental debt and unemployment. While at individual level the 
explanations on trust are more sought in the individual characteristics of citizens as well as in 
the evaluations of government performance and subjective evaluations of the political and 
economical systems. The focus of this study lies on explaining trust using measures that are 
related to the crisis. 
 First, a country level analysis was conducted, to explore if trust can be explained by 
the economic changes that occurred during the credit and sovereign debt crisis.  
Second, an individual analysis was conducted in order to explore whether crisis related 
indicators such as: crisis performance, problem solving capacity and (economic) uncertainty 
are of influence on governmental trust. Third, the individual analysis controlled whether non 
crisis related and common explanations play a role in governmental trust.  The societal 
relevance is that the sovereign debt crisis has not yet been resolved. Understanding the 
conditions that influences trust at aggregated and individual level might make it possible to 
develop counter measures to battle negative changes in trust. The scientific relevance is that 
no research has been done to the relative one-dimensional measure of performance, crisis 
performance. No research was ever conducted on the affects of problem solving capacity to 
governmental trust; by exploring problem solving capacity aimed is to widen the 
understanding of trust in governments. 
51 
 
The most important finding of the first part of this study is that there indeed is a drop 
of trust in 2007 and 2009. Second, trust in national and EU government is more affected in the 
eurozone countries than in the non-eurozone countries. Third, the results indicate that trust 
cannot be explained as a product of a more general trend. Depending on the country which is 
examined, mixed results are found: there are countries with positive and negative trend lines. 
The limitation of this part of the study is that it is a relative short time period to examine 
general trends. A wider timeframe could give more insight in trust patterns and would be 
recommended for further studies. Fourth, a positive relation is found between unemployment 
and trust in national government, this relation is observable before and during both crises. 
Other economic indicators such as inflation and debt are not related to trust in national and 
EU government. The drop of trust cannot be explained only by the changes in economic 
conditions in the countries. Countries where unemployment and debt stayed equal or declined 
still experienced a decline of trust.  This part of the research could have been improved by 
adding more explanatory variables. Subsequent studies need to focus more on what explains 
trust at aggregated level, and not on what relates to trust. Variables that would improve this 
model for explaining trust during crisis are: consumers’ sentiment, market sentiment, 
(negative) media attention, government accountability and counter policies. Fifth, in most 
countries trust in national and EU government are positively and strongly related to each 
other. The countries which are exceptions to this rule are: Belgium, Luxembourg, Finland and 
Estland. Research findings hint towards a more congruent relationship, where trust in national 
government is used as proxy for trust in European government. Since correlations do not give 
answers on causality, definite claims on this subject cannot be stated. This restricts the value 
of this study. Subsequent studies should further develop the investigation to this subject in 
order to give a more finalized answer on whether the relationship is congruent or 
compensatory.  
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The second part of this study focussed on the individual explanation of trust in 2011.  
The most important findings are; first that crisis performance is the strongest predictor of trust 
in national and EU government. This finding corresponds with the literature on government 
performance. Still it is striking that a one-dimensional concept of performance has such an 
effect. Second, problem solving capacity does significantly influence trust, yet the amount of 
influence is very minimal. Therefore it needs to be reconsidered whether problem solving 
capacity is a valuable addition to this model. Third, subjective and more objective economic 
measures seem to be capable in explaining trust in national and EU government. After crisis 
performance these are the strongest predictors of trust. Fourth, uncertainty is only partially 
explaining trust. When uncertainty is created at country level, trust is affected, but uncertainty 
in the personal sphere does not influence governmental trust. Still, the effects of uncertainties 
on trust in national and EU government are very weak. Fifth, life satisfaction and social status 
are influencing governmental trust. Again the odds are relatively low; hence the predictive 
power is weak. 
 Concluding; the best measures to explain individual trust in national and EU 
government are crisis performance followed by objective and subject economic conditions. 
One of the major problems concerning this part of the research is that due to the large N of 
15.726, a significant outcome is reached earlier. If this study would be replicated within a 
single country, with a smaller N, replication of the findings could become questionable. 
Although this study has shed light on trust during the sovereign debt crisis, more 
research is needed in order to obtain a better understanding on how aggregated and individual 
levels of trust are formed during times of crisis.  Additional research will provide scholars 
with a better understanding on how trust is compromised by the crisis. There is still much to 
be learned on trust, as Hibbing and Theiss-More (2001:250) describe; “No complex 
phenomena such as public attitudes towards government can be neatly explained”. 
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Due to the complexity of “the phenomena trust” it was impossible to take all available 
explanations that literature provides into account. This must be noted as a limitation of this 
research.  
 One way of improving this study would be a single country analysis in order to 
explore whether the explanations found for trust would also occur at country level. A cross 
country comparison can then be made to examine whether found explanations for trust during 
the sovereign debt crisis hold up. A cross country comparison also provides insight in the 
differences between the countries on the reaction of the general public on the crisis. 
Additional studies could produce a better insight into trust at an individual level.  
Another limitation of the second part of the study has been the fact that it’s measured 
in a single point in time. It would be highly recommendable for the crisis measure (crisis 
performance and problem solving capacity) to see whether they hold in different moments in 
the crisis. Unfortunately, these questions where only asked in one Eurobarometer survey, 
therefore it was impossible to study them in multiple time settings. 
 Concluding, there is still plenty of room for additional research on trust during 
economic crises. Hopefully it will provide us with better insight in the effects crises have on 
trust. Nevertheless, for now the conclusion is that during the crisis there was indeed a drop of 
trust. The drop of trust in national government can be linked to unemployment at country 
level. Trust in national and EU government is influenced by crisis performance and the 
perceived economical conditions at individual level. If governments can convince their 
citizens that they produce effective crisis performance, trust will grow. As mentioned earlier, 
in the end it all seems to be a matter of perception management whether citizens trust their 
institutions. By tempering the expectations and by keeping performance up, this should lead 
to positive evaluations, followed by more trust.  
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